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1 came to Japan in '86， '87 and '90. One of the first persons 1 got in touch with was 
Dr. Ishida. He played a very important role which 1 would like to underline. Afterwards 1 
had a student who was preparing her Ph.D. in Japan specializing in planning. Thanks to 
the白 nterfor Urban Studies， she spent two years with Dr. Ishida. Now her Ph.D. has 
been pub1ished under the title “The Land Bubble in Japan." 50 this pla田 isvery meaningful 
to me. 
Before getting into the subject. 1 would like to tel you that I've been working for a 
long time on this question of land and every day it becomes more complicated for ine to 
understand. I've been educated as an economist， 1 am working in econometrics. At the 
beginning 1 studied prices and did many regressions: Land prices as a function of this and 
that. It was possible to derive some conclusions， but the models of economics were， 1 
should say. rather poor. 50 1 went on to study law， because law and economics are so 
completely intermingled. in an attempt to explain what happens with land. land use and 
land policy. And 1 included the question of political science because owning land is power 
in long-term history as well as in financial regulations in modem society... at least in most 
countries that 1 know. Institutional arrangements are very different from one country to 
another. from Netherlands to Japan. from 5ri Lanka to France. 50 1 apologize. because in 
my presentation 1 shall mix. maybe too much. those elements to give you my understanding 
of the Question of land. 
As an introduction. 1 would also like to mention that this subject seems very 
specialized. My point of view is that the question of land and property is a key question in 
the evolution of most advanced civilizations. There are phenomena of money gluts. 
international flows of capital. which are invested in assets such as land which include a 
monopoly power. And there are not many things that provide monopoly power. You cannot 
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do that with usual consumer goods， electronics and so on. lt means as well that the 
connection between land and the banking system is another key problem in the land market， 
esp配ialyin Japan. 
1 intend to first give you f our comments on the enigma of land， to which many 
questions are referred... Questions to the economist， to the lawyer， to the planner and also 
to the politician. Then 1 will talk about basic data， about the land market and land 
management， especially in the case of Japan， by referring to land prices， land owners， the 
relationship between towns and the country and property market. Part 1I and II will be 
about the development of the bubble. In '87 1 published an article in which 1 talked of “the 
land bubble." People asked where this word came from. It did progress and some years 
later... 1 think it's very negative in consequences. But this word is now used in papers every 
day so we are accustomed to it. 
1 will describe what a bubble is. The explanation is not so simple-neither its development 
nor why it lasted such a long time-or how it came to an inflexion and then burst. It is not 
so clear whether the economy burst or soft-landing. But anyway the tendency is not the 
same as bef ore. 
Then 1 will try to give enough time to discuss more at length some of the elements of 
public policy that can be addressed related to the question of land policy. There are many of 
them. 1 listed more than 10 elements of public policy and we can select some f ordiscussion. 
1 first sugg四tthat land is something of an enigma， of a mystery for the economist. In 
fact， 1 do not know any single economic theory that explains in a satisfactory way how the 
price of land is fixed and evolves. 1 think it was David Ricardo who said relevant things 
some centuries ago but he was mainly addressing agricultural land with the question of 
differential fertility. Everybody knows and agrees that it cannot be satisfactorily discussed. 
But later on， when urban development began， things got more complicated. In the main 
trends of economic theory 1 would like to single out two main components. 
One is the mainstream neo-classical economic theory. Probably you know at least the 
basic elements of it， the theory of pure competition， supply and demand and the equilibrium， 
price when the two curves meet and so on. That's well known. But it doesn't explain much 
about the city and the property markets for one very single reason that land appropriation 
does not follow those of usual goods that are produced. Land is not produced， itincludes 
some monopoly and it is to some extent a public good and it's producing externalities and so 
on. It is a typical element which poses the main difficulties in neひー classicaleconomic theory. 
80 it is not well explained by the theory of pure competition. 
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The other set of economic theory is - albeit of reduced importance today - Marxist 
theory. It splits into many components. And the critic that should be addressed is different. 
It is addressing time. It cannot be discussed but it is to some extent useless since it has not 
produced any measurable yardsticks. So when this theory says that land is a relationship of 
power and suggest to split rent into different components， what to do with that? So what? 
It does not help much to explain the price of land and how it actually behaves on the 
market. Marx has not written much about land， most1y in letters to Engels. He says to 
Engels “1 know much about economics but one problem remains. Land， 1 do not understand" 
and asks Engels to provide some explanation. 
on the side of the neo-classical theory， maybe you've heard of Leon Walras. He can be 
considered as one of the f a thers of this theory. Walras was one of the f ounders of liberal 
economic theory， and he has written about land. In the late 19th century he proved through 
a mathematical model that the price of land could become infinite. It was therefore n町田sary
to nationalize al land in order to protect market mechanisms. And in a paradox related to 
the question of land， he advocates nationalization of land in order to promote a fr.田 market
economy. 
This line of thinking continues in the writing of an author that 1 find interesting and 
stimulating: Henry George， an American philosopher， most1y known for the “single tax" 
idea. But not only that. He says that as economies get more and more sophisticated and 
productive， the share of the total product will be captured more and more by the broad 
category of property owners. 
That is most1y based on intuition， not strict economic reasoning. Mr. George said that 
the tax system should provide some sharing of benefits in order for the public authority to 
collect at least a reasonable part of the total cake. Now， even in Russia， the “Georgian" 
ideas are gaining some relevance. There is a lobby of Georgians that are opposed to 
privatization， and who suggest that public authority should hold land ownership and lease it. 
The Dutch and other experiences and practices are positive enough about land leasing to make 
it worth scrutinizing. 
Land also poses a difficulty for the lawyer， at least a delicate matter for the lawyer 
and for the lawmaker. It's a category， the law about land and urban development， that has 
always been at odds with the rest of public law. It's a curious mixture， at least in most 
European countries， and in Japan too as 1 understand it， between public law and private 
law. It's a permanent fight， or a balance difficult to find， between on the one side the 
principles of civil law， the guarantee of property， and on the other side the public law whose 
main objective is to guarantee public interest in urban development. A relevant balance 
between those two objectives must be陀alizedthrough land law. 
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A meaningful legal settlement recently occurred in Osaka. A property broker died in 
Osaka and his son inherited property as田ssedat 2 billion yen. A recent d配r田 oninheritance 
tax says that if a property has been bought within les than three years， then the assessment 
is at full market value. Practically， given the escalation in prices， this“poor" man's 
inheritance tax base was 2 bi1ion yen， so he had to pay at the maximum level. The amount 
of tax to be paid was greater than the market value of the goods he inherited! So he went 
to the court and said “It's not corr回t，my property would thus have a negative value?" 
And the court said “You are right. Your property has not been ‘guaranteed' and you do 
not have to pay the tax." 
It's a typical case of conflict between these two different objectives. 1 don't know what 
will be the future of this settlement since it can be appealed to another level.. maybe at a 
time of another new bubble. As far as the guarant田 ofproperty and the application of civil 
law is concerned， the French (Napoleonic) Code of 1804 has exerted some influence， notably 
in Japan in the late nineteenth田ntury.
1 read about the building of the Tokyo subway between world wars and there was the 
“movement of tsubo": Reading the civil code， land owners said “l' m the owner until the 
center of the earth， so the subway will not come under my land." Then of course the 
subway was built under the roads because that land was public property. So according to 
this notion of public property， 1 don't know to what extent it has been applied， but it is a 
clear example of this fight between the protection of individual rights on one side and the 
protection of the public welfare on the other side， defined by two competing fields of law. 
In France there is often a flexible practice at the same time it is rigid law， like this 
one， and at the same time a soft way to turn around the law， in this case through 
expropriation of underground land or concession of public services. So at the same time it is 
a strong principle and very flexible way to cope with these problems. 
The third enigma is for the planner. 1 shall focus on one point which is the difficu1ty 
raised by the economic consequences of zoning. That has been my initial fields of reflection. 
1 have written a book on zoning and equity in land planning， that is， the link between land 
values and zoning. It's a very simple observation that the price of a piece of land depends 
greatly on zoning. This problem must be decided， whether in an authoritarian way， say 
where “It is right that we zone， itis unequal， but you have to accept it." That was the 
French way in the sixties. Whether you say， this is the United States system and the case 
law about the expropriation issue. 1 think it's a key subject in the question of planning 
economics. In the United States， the constitution says that if zoning is too restrictive for a 
piece of land， then the land owner is allowed to get compensation. That's called “taking" ， 
its the same thing as being expropriated. In fact， this constitutional principle has been used 
to a large extent to challenge or to cancel zoning measures. Righ t now， there are thousands 
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of trials about this question. I met a specialist on the subject 10 days ago in Tokyo. He has 
written a book about this“taking issue". 80me of you may be interested in discussing this 
issue and the measures that accommodate this in叫uity，such as the hampering of development 
rights， or taxation taking into account the density which is allowed by the zoning plan. 
But there is also some risk， ifyou make planning completely flexible， as is the British 
way. The British planning system is not legally binding， so it creates a phenomenon of 
“floating value." Every landowner can hope， even if it is a plan spぬfiedas green space. 80 
practical1y， this hope is not zero， even the greenbelt has been threatened some years ago 
with a very large project inside the London Grl田nbelt.The legal eff，配tof planning are thus 
quite different from what isin the rest of Europe “legally binding." 
And final1y， the question of land can be awkward for the state， for the government. 
Or more preci田，ly，it raises a contradiction among various objectives of the state. Idea11y， in 
a textbook， you begin the introduction saying that land should be used for the welfare of a1 
citizens， with spacious open areas， pleasant dwe11ings， houses， gardens and so on. Planners 
love this type of literature which is obscuring the difficulty of the real task of choosing 
between conflicting uses. 
For the state， land implies different attitudes for the government. There is the 
配onomicstan四 ofdoing public equipment， roads and so on. Land is thus a cost reflected in 
public expenses. Remember the “8hiodome process." 80me years ago， that area had to be 
redeveloped :田%of the total cost was to buy land for the state to redevelop the neighborhood. 
And it was then postponed. 
80 that's the first side， for the state， land is a cost， one of many in the development 
process. But land is also a source of funding， because of taxation. This is important in the 
bubble period when， precisely， for the state， the tax proc朗dsincreased rapidly. There has 
been a hope that final1y a bubble would a110w to finance any public serviω. 80， the more 
rapidly prices are increasing， and the more it wil1 be possible to fund public equipment. This 
is quite important for the public policy at the time of the bubble. 
Mystery， enigma， ambiguity for many actors in the land markets... Let us stop it here 
and come to the question of land in Japan， and data about the problem. I'm sure that most 
of you know much more than 1 do. 80 1'1 give you only my personal impression and 
reactions. 
The first thing 1 should say is the difficulty to get coherent data about land prices; 
not because there are no data， but because there are too many data. I've got a lot of them. 
But it is difficult for me to select because there are several assessment methods and for an 
economic analysis it is really a complicated situation to know how data have been elaborated. 
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There are several ways of assessing land prices; beginning from koji kakaku， kijun kakaku， 
rosenka， market value and so on... And there are relationships among al those values. 
That makes the case of Netherlands attractive where it was so comfortable because the 
prices have not been moving. Land is publicly produced， and its price is stable and is 
perfect1y known in advance. In my country it's much worse because there are few data and it 
is very difficult to know the price. But it is difficult by nature because prices are different 
from one place to another. Inside Europe， there is a very different situation from north to 
south. 
My second comment about Japan is the extraordinary level of land prices. That is not 
new. That does not date back to the r配entbubble of the late 80s but dates back to WWII. 
In fact it began in the late 50s and the early 60s and there have been three bubbles. The 
first one is '60， '61， '62 bubble in the sense that the price of land was in high discrepancies 
with the fundamentals of the economy. The second one was clearly '73， '74 and those two 
bubbles - which did not really burst - led prices in Japan to levels that cannot be 
compared with those in any European countries. The explanation is complicated， but let's say 
that the absolute level and relative to concern to other economic goods is obviously 
different. 
The characteristics of those two bubbles are that they did not burst， they went on. 
There was a stabilization after this period of very quick a∞eleration. Or， small decrease in 
real value， but stable in terms of nominal value. Only the third one burst after 1990. In 
fact what has brought the level of land prices at this incredible level are Bubble 1 and 
Bubble 2. When Bubble 3 began， itstarted from a level which was questionable compared 
with those to which we are accustomed to， at least in European countries， and mostly in 
terms of their relationship with the economy at large. 
A key aspect of the problem is obviously the link between the banking system and land 
and property values. This is the core of what 1 try to understand right now. Economic 
development is promoted by using land and property as a collateral for banking activity. 
* Land owners and the land myth 
Japan does not have a monopoly with the “land myth." This is shared with many 
countries. ln France， talking about land， we always talk about this strong attachment 
people hold to their piece of land， sometimes reflected in the debates in the Parliament. 
During a public debate on a recent statute about land， many MPs talked about “This poor 
old farmer's piece of land， his only wealth， etc." My impression is that there is something 
parallel in Japan and in France. But this form of the land myth in France seems to be 
diminishing now. Especially， the aspect of the land myth saying that maybe owning a piece 
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of land is the best way to guarantee purchasing power for the future， to conserve the value 
of money， isprobably on the way to disappear. 
Possibly this same thing happened during the 70s and 80s. 1 can say that in France this 
psychological feeling， attachment to land， isto some extent over. After W orld War I， 
France was a country of agriculture to a large extent， and this was meaningful. At present 
it is over， this form of attachment， for on an economic side it has no worth because 
everybody is convinced that the price of land is now unpredictable. It seems that both urban 
and rural land prices are completely unpredictable. Now in Japan too， itseems that the “ 
land myth" is， itseems to me， mostly economic now: many people are doing the economic 
reasoning about what to do， what is my best choice， should 1 relocate to Tama to buy a 
larger house， or keep my small one and so on. That seems reasonable. But 1 mean that this 
is different from the traditional land myth. This can be ∞nnected to the fact that Bubble 1 
went on， Bubble 2 went on， but Bubble 3 went too far， and had to stop somewhere， on the 
配onomicside. Bankers now agree with that point， they cannot do anything else. 
1 read an inquiry made by the Kokudocho recently about the feeling of people with 
resp田tto land. One of the questions was “Would you like that the land prices go on rising 
or would you prefer they go down?" 1 don't remember exactly the figures but the curious 
thing is that the sample of those who answered “1 would like them to go on rising" is 
absolutely not synonymous of land owners. There are many land owners who say “No， it
should go down to more reasonable prices" and vice versa. So there is a feeling shared by 
many people that increasing land prices are synonymous of economic difficulties. That is once 
again the link with the banking system and economic activities. 
About the relationship between Tokyo， main cities and the country， we can say that in 
Japan， as in many countries， there is a flexibility and a transmission of the price increases 
from the center to the suburbs and then to the country. This transmission is very different 
from country to country. Some countries have succeeded in separating the agricultural and 
urban land markets， Germany is a good example. Less so in the past 10 years but before 
then for a long time it had been efficient in separating the rural land markets and the 
sp配ulationin urban areas. Denmark is also an excellent example of a system that completely 
isolates agricultural land and urban land markets. 
1 would better understand the interaction among various land markets， in the center， 
suburbs， inthe country， or golf courses and so on. This is anywhere a complicated theme to 
understand clearly， and especially so in Japan given the level of land priωs. 
Finally， 1 would like to mention a characteristic that lies in the activity of the land 
market. It's very illiquid in Japan. 1 don't know if this is good or bad， but the activity of 
the market， the turnover of land ownership is very low as compared with that in other 
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countries. The bubble has increased this phenomena. According to the data by Kokudocho 
and the activity of the market， the number of transaction has halved within the last 15 
years. 
This increases one of the consequences of the bubble to which I'm coming now. The 
more illiquid the market， the quickest the effects of the beginning bubble. This is quite 
important. ln a very liquid market， the adjustments are quicker than in an illiquid market. 
This is for many reasons， economic as well as psychologica1. 
This aspect is emphasized in a study by the OECD (1991). It is a very interesting and 
important paper published 3 years ago at the peak of the bubble， called “Urban Land 
Market." 1 pick three main conclusions of the evolution， of the bubble period. The first one 
is that most countries have registered the declining purchasing power in land and housing. 1 
mean that with a mean wage， you can buy less and less housing and land. 1 take an 
example in Switzerland， supposed to be a quiet country， where a bubble occurred as well. 
The first clues in terms of purchasing power (Fig. 1 Price indices for apartment buildings， 
vacant land， and condominiums in Geneva and Swiss consumer price index (1978=100)). 
What is important is that land has been pushing the property boom. This connection betw倒 1
the land value and property value is a key issue， not so well understood. The relationship 
between land and the properties built upon it is complex， and requires some empirical work 
to be better understood. 
Another examples with Germany.... price of land， income， construction cost and stock 
can add something to this curve (Fig. 2 Trends in land prices for residential areas sin田 1963
compared with the costs of living， construction costs and the level of income). Look at 
construction costs. These increased less than income. That is a constant argument of the 
Ministers of Construction anywhere: They push the efficiency in building activities that 
makes construction activity cheaper， and they are improving the technique and it is cheaper 
and cheaper as compared to the income. The purchasing power in terms of housing area is 
thus increasing. But al this， and that was Henry George's argument， isswallowed up by 
land price increases. The land share is increasing as a share of the total cost of the 
building. 
The second main evolution of the period is dualism. By that 1 mean areas that were 
expensive at the beginning. became rapidly much more expensive. and on the opposite， areas 
which were cheap， remain cheap or get stil cheaper.... this can be illustra ted by the case of 
the Paris Region (Fig. 3 Paris housing market) . 
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What shall we to do with the bubble? Which public policies should address the problem 
? Many put deregulation as a priority. If we deregulate - it is argued - more land will be 
put on the market， prices will go down， as in page 1 of any textbook on economy. 
Practical1y， this is not true in consolidated urban areas. This can be shown by the ca田 of
Paris where land supply has increased very rapidly... as long as its price was also increasing， 
in clear contradiction with the “referred" theory. This is an important misunderstanding. 
Deregulation means various things. 80me of them are quite relevant. We mean here that its 
application to land markets should be handled very carefully. 
The explanation is not completed， but this means that when prices go up， supply is 
going up as well. One of the explanations lies in the behavior of land owners， which is 
usually not such as described in the textbooks. The land owner is relocating when the priωis 
going up， quickly enough. But the value of time and the opportunity cost is quite different 
for a landowner and for a firm. 
This is more a question than a conclusion. 1 think that this should be questioned by 
more empirical words and more comparative observations of different countries. 
One of the questions raised is why this bubble lasted so long? It is obviously something 
not reasonable in economic theory. Why did it last so long? 
The first explanation is that as soon as the bubble began， everybody， or at least 
many， are interested in the bubble going on. Brokers， of course. Developers， obviously. 
Landowners， they are (or they feel) richer. For the state， tax receipts are increasing. 80 
everybody is happy with that. 
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At the very beginning， nobody knows that it is a bubble. But when this has really 
taken off， then everybody wishes it to go on. 1 have forgotten one category which is maybe 
one of the most important， 1 mean bankers. Because bankers are really the key in promoting 
the bubble by accepting (and stimulating the use of) land as a collateral， a guarantee. What 
is it a guarantee? The guarantee is land. The banker， as soon as he accepts land as a 
collateral， his interest to promote land price increases. This is c10sing the circ1e of the 
bubble， with the activity of bankers， using land as a collateral. This is also a key element 
in the conflict between the Minister of Finance and the bankers to know how land prices 
should be assessed now. Because if it is accepted that land prices are only 20 or 30 or 40% 
of what they were at the peak of the bubble， then the situation is potentially dramatic for 
banks， and the taxpayer should be called to rescue the system. If not， ifeverybody agrees， 
even wrong， if it is collectively accepted to put prices in official assessment at a fictitious 
high level， higher than the real market price， then it makes it possible， at the risk of 
prolonging the freezing of the markets. It田emsthat opinions related to that are now split. 
This is also clearly related to the question of“bad loans"， mωt1y to property developers， 
evaluated at betw田n40 and 80 trillion yens. The level of“badn四s"precisely depends on the 
land price assessments. 
Deregulation again... we should pay special attention to the regulations that apply to 
banks， to the banking system. In France， this has changed during in the bubble period. 
Banks were authorized to finance a development project up to 100% of its value. 1 am the 
banker， you are the developer， 1 trust you， and 1 will finance your project. Billions of yen 
go on， possibly 100% of the project. This is no more possible， this will no more happen， at 
least the developer must bring 30% of the total cost， not going to other banks sharing the 
risk of the development. Possibly this careful behavior is mOre important that the international 
ratios， BIS， and others， but the “prevention" rules that apply to bankers who finance urban 
development are， 1 think， an important aspect. 
The second concern is about land taxation and its possible effects related to the bubble 
phenomenon. Land taxation usually addresses three conflicting objectives: 1) Tax on land 
and property is supposed to bring money to public authorities; 2) Equity is well known but 
very often forgotten. It includes the notion of betterment recoupment with the idea that 
speculation is not legitimate， and tax should allow the public authority to collect this money 
to use it in the public interest and; 3) Economic incentive， for instance putting a tax on 
unused land in order to promote its use. Or tax allowance for those whose property is kept 
as open space， etc. 
About land， taxation.… frequent drawbacks of taxation systems are unsuitability and 
mixture of objectives， which are conflicting， because you cannot do anything with a tax. In 
Japan now， there is much talking about the land holding tax. There is a 0.3% annual tax 
on land， introduced in 1992 as an incentive to develop unused or undeトusedland， as well as 
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a way to deter speculation. The practice is not always successful. It depends on whether the 
calculation of the land owner is， better pay the tax and wait. On the other side， ifthe 
landowner accepts to develop， then it is a very bad tax in terms of proceeds and the 
Ministry of Finan田 do田 notlike that because this tax will not bring any money. 
The same mechanism has been attempted for instance in Germany in the 60s， as well as 
in other countries. And it has generally been a failure. Not for the principle but for the 
question of practice and opposition of the Ministry of Finance:“A tax must bring money" 
they say. And “be simple to calc叫ate."1 bought a “booklet" of叙)()pag田， in the Kasumigaseki 
goverriment book shop， called “Taxation 8ystem in Japan". 1 looked for property taxation， 
and really， it's like France and Germany and other countries: so many taxes， often modified 
with several possibly conflicting objectives. 
Inside taxation， 1 would say a few words about the question of who pays infrastructure 
cost， equipment cost. Development requires roads， sewerage， water supply and so on， and 
this is a question to know who is supposed to pay for that: It can be the taxpayer Oocal or 
national)， the user-consumer or the benefiting property owner. 
In Japan there is no specific and explicit legislation about that. Negotiation is on a 
case-by-case basis. In France， a statute exists， it is rather well organized. It is a part of 
the urban legislation. Who can bear the burden? Three categories of people pay for those 
services: 1) The taxpayer... this is the simplest method but possibly wrong in terms of 
equity: it is not reasonable that one equipment in a specific location be paid by al 
taxpayers. 80 it is the most usual system but quite inequitable and inefficient on an 
economic basis; 2) The second solution is the benefiting land owner. Building an equipment， 
road， sewerage system increases the value of land in front or in the vicinity of this 
equipment. That has inter田tedvarious countries， for instance in 80uth America. It results in 
collecting by anticipation， from the land owners， the cost of the equipment to be built. The 
subway of Caracas， Venezuela， has been partly financed by taxation on the benefiting land 
owners， with a criteria in which anybody who had a property less than 10 minutes on foot 
from the metro stations had to pay. 
The times of bubble have also been times of CrISIS for urban planning. In some 
countries， planning is very much criticized for some years， because of excess rigidity. 1 think 
this is relevant to some extent， tha t planning should not be only or mostly， as i t isin 
France， to some extent， and in Germany as well， a set of limitations on the use of 
property. It should include that， of course， but be at the same time， an engine to promote 
urban development. We should change from a static， non-economic， physical planning to a 
dynamic， economically relevant process of planning. 
This would be “market planning"， understanding the market mechanism. It would be 
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different in terms of practice. This was， and stil is to some extent， the practice of the 
Bebauungslan (B-plan) in Germany， which is an active pr胸部.A landowner inside a B-plan 
is submitted to thr田 consequencesonce the B-plan is approved. First， land is reallotted (“
Umlegung"). The landowner gets in exchange another pi配eof land. Second， he has to pay 
for equipment， 90% of roads， open space， and others， and receives the corresponding bil 
before the development happens. That's the second consequence. The third one is that the 
landowner must give fr田 30%of his land to the municipality. 
This is a strong， dynamic pr∞'es to promote and control urban development. That， in 
my opinion， isin principle a sound planning which is at the same time a dynamic vision. 
The situation of Germany is not very satisfactory at the moment. The process of 
unification is one problem. But another difficulty is now found in too much litigation. In 
Germany， laws are rather complicated， it's easy for anybody， on a broad base， to go to a 
court and litigate about for example a B-plan， when it is confronting his interest. As soon 
as there is a “serious" reason to go to the court， automatically works are being stopped. 
This is an important practical issue in Germany. Because if the law is right， then many 
projects are blocked. That's why so much development now happening in Germany is 
developing outside a B-plan. The very principle of the B-plan， concentrated on urban 
development， isbasically a good system but this trend is risky. 
The Dutch system is very attractive with landowners accepting a collective “rule of the 
game" according to which no business is made with raw land: as soon as a piece of land is 
zoned for development， the landowner take the initiative and goes to the municipality and 
sels i t f or a price tha t can be comprised， between 500 and 1，α泊 yenper square meter， at a 
maximum. So bare land in Netherlands is not a problem， be it in the center of Rotterdam， 
Amsterdam or in the country. That's the rule of the game ac田ptedfor long. The municipality 
is then developing the area. This is usually expensive， because of drainage works. Afterwards， 
cross subsidization intervenes inside the development area. Then the leasing mechanism is 
often applied， and obviously the system is quite satisfactory as an anti-(!yclical device. 
1 should say one last thing， about the land myth and the notion of property. 1 come 
back to the notion of land property， the very nature of the property of land. Practically， in 
any constitution of Eastern and Central European countries， who are changing their economic 
systems right now， the definition of property rights seems as an evidence of an absolute 
right， encompassing the right to use a piece of land， the profits from using land， and the 
right to sel land and dispose of it. This is commonly accepted as usual common sense. 
When looking at the application， from country to country， it is very different in the 
practice. As soon as you look at the weight of various rights， or the articulation inside the 
bundle of rights， this appearance of unity of the law of property is split. In the set of 
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bundles which is the right of property， including for instance mineral rights， underground 
rights， air rights， right to do this， right to do that... and at the heart of it， development 
right， the law of property should be made more sp配ific.
The price of a piece of land depends fundamentally on what is allowed to do with it. 
Then， what is it? Is it a public decision that the piece of land can be used for some use. 
There are various traditions in the world related to that. There was in northern Europe a 
tradition which was more collective common use of land. 80 there was a mixture of interest. 
The notion of absolute right of property， such as it has been defined as well by 
German law and Napoleon Code with different mixtures， could be changed in main urban 
areas to put again land as a mixture of public and private goods， thus separating the 
development rights from the right of property on land， and 1 think it's a key stake for the 
years to come. A good example (or better than the other) can be found in northern Europe， 
even in a densely populated country like the Netherlands. 8uch a balanced definition of 
property rights can help the planner not to do a plan that conflict with interests and then is 
modified under the p陀ssureof the public opinion. 
The only way to kil or (at least) soften the land myth is maybe through some type of 
redefinition of the right of property on land; by strong differentiation between the users' 
rights that should be respected， and the right to benefit which would be shared between the 
public authority and the land owner. 
But this is simpler to state than to practically implement . 
.Domo Arigato Cozaimaso. 
